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ABSTRACT

Described and critiqued are studies that attempt to describe how personality factors affect foreign policy decision making. Political behavior cannot be explained in terms of personality alone. Such an attempt is a psychological reductionism that ignores the chains of causation that run from underlying personality construct to social and political structures. The paper begins by discussing rational models of foreign policy decision making that have been used in psychological studies. Two other models, the organizational process model and the bureaucratic political model, are then discussed. An examination follows of how I. Destler and A. George, not satisfied with either of the latter two models, chose to combine the two models for a more fruitful explanatory device. How other political writers have concentrated on the president's relationships with his advisers when making foreign policy decisions--a combination of impact analysis and presidential style analysis--is discussed. The paper concludes by discussing the theoretical, methodological, and data problems that plague all these approaches to the study of personality and foreign policy decision making. (RM)

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Personality Variables in Foreign Policy Decision Making Studies

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Today, it is hardly controversial to say that personality factors affect politics. Yet, when one attempts to describe how personality factors affect politics, the problems begin. Controversy occurs when an attempt is made to "specify the boundaries of the functioning of personality in politics. It appears that the boundaries may vary a great deal, from problem to problem and situation to situation" (Eulau, 1963, p. 86). When we attempt to address the relationship between the two variables, personality and political behavior, we are actually contemplating a network of intra-and-inter-personal behavior. The complexity is real and unavoidable. Links exist between personality and political behavior, but these links are not of "critical causal importance" (George, 1975, p. 105). Personality dimensions "add and aid" our understanding of political behavior (Verba, 1961), but they do not provide us with all the answers.

When political scientists attempt to examine these "networks" of political behavior, they are faced with "problems of evidence, inference and conceptualization" (Greenstein, 1975, p. 1). According to Gordon Allport in Personality, there are at least fifty "types" of definitions of personality (1937, pp. 24-54). Personality is an "inferred entity" (Greenstein, 1975, p. 3). "Personality,..., is an abstraction from behavior, not something independent of behavior. It is not directly accessible to empirical observation. Rather it is abstracted from and constructed out of the very patterns of behavior and feeling, past and present, that it is intended to explain and interpret" (Eulau, 1963, p. 86). Students of human behavior use the term to describe "regularities" in behavior. However, not only is there a problem of defining personality, but also there is a problem agreeing to the nature of personality, the nature of these so called regularities of human behavior. There are those who view man as a static creature, a passive agent "who merely responds to environmental stimuli" (George, 1980, p. 56).

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Such a view comes from Alan Isaak:

> People behave politically not because of the conscious calculation of goals and strategies, nor even because of the influence of recently learned attitude and opinion, but rather because of personality traits which are developed at an early age and remain fairly constant throughout a person's life. (1975, p. 175).

According to George (1975), the idea of a static personality has by definition severe problems (p. 116). George agrees with cognitive psychologists who view man "as selectively responding to and actively shaping his environment" (1980, p. 56). Man is a "problem solver" not a passive creature (see George, 1980, pp. 56-57). A model of man that suggests otherwise is a simplification and deludes the investigator.

Man is not a simple creature. And "personality itself, as indicated, is not a simple concept, but rather an intricate system comprised of the individual's character-rooted needs and motives, his sense of self (or "identity") and the various self-esteem vulnerabilities and needs that accompany it, the skills and adaptive patterns that the individual has acquired for relating to other individuals and for coping with or mastering a variety of tasks and situations, and the cognitive beliefs and knowledge in terms of which he organizes his experiences, plans his activities, and diagnoses and responds to new situations" (1980, p. 6).

However, "unless we subscribe to an exclusively indiviiualistic psychology, we must assume that what is social, cultural, and personal in political behavior is so intertwined that either over-or under emphasis of any one distorts political reality" (Eulau, 1963, p. 89). Political behavior is not only responsive to personal factors but also to group (social) or cultural factors. How are these levels of behavior, personal, social and cultural, to be linked conceptually? Personal values vary in degrees and intensitites from week to week and from day to day. Is an individual's behavior the result of his personality dimensions, or is it the result of where he sits in the bureaucracy? Is the behavior the result of a personal goal or a group goal? Did the individual hold this view

before he joined the group or only afterwards? Cultural values--are they the result of a composite of individual values, or can we infer a specific individual's values from an understanding of cultural values? The questions are many and difficult.

Psychologists and sociologists have argued for years about the linkage of personal, social, and cultural factors in the explanation of behavior. What is the "relevance and importance of personal dispositions...versus situations in determining social behavior" (Smith, 1968, pp. 18-19). Political behavior is a "function of both environmental situations and psychological predispositions" (Greenstein, 1975, p. 7; see also George, 1958, pp. 18-26). It may be said that man is "a political actor in a social matrix of interpersonal relations" (Eulau, 1963, p. 39). The social network or matrix implies:

> That human behavior, including political action, consists of interactions and transactions that orient people towards each other, making them mutually responsive. (Eulau, 1963, p. 39)

It is the sum of all man's interpersonal relations, both past, present and the anticipated future, that comprise the social matrix. Political behavior then involves all past, present and anticipated future relationships between people. Thus, man takes on social roles which are activated through interpersonal relationships (see Eulau, 1963, pp. 39-40).

A role is an "aspect of personality that refers to an individual's social identity" (Eulau, 1963, p. 100). "Political behavior, then, is always conducted in the performance of a political role" (Eulau, 1963, p. 40). However, man is not limited to one role. The more complex his social matrix, the more relationships a man has, the more numerous and varied his social roles. The "relationship between role and other aspects of personality is not easy to determine empirically because the behavior involved is elusive" (Eulau, 1963, p. 105). Roles may be viewed also on three levels of analysis: personal, social and cultural.

These three levels offer various perspectives:

> personal-"idiosyncratic definitions of the role held by different actors";
>
> social-"structure of interaction connection, or bond that constitues a relationship";
>
> cultural-"norms, expectations, rights, and duties that sanction the maintenance of the relationship and attendant behavioral patterns" (see Eulau, 1963, p. 40; note: not in proper order)

These levels of analysis lay "bare the inter-relatedness and inter-dependence of people" (Eulau, 1963, p. 40). Role networks or role systems are "reciprocal or transactional" relationships between individuals and groups (see Eulau, 1963, p. 50).

Thus it is obvious that political behavior may be in "response to social situations and cultural norms that may be quite independent of personality needs" (Eulau, 1963, p. 106). "The investigator must assess not only the ways in which situations and factors constrain the behavior of a...political actor, but also the ways in which the...political actor's personality and behavior shape the situation over time" (George, 1975, p. 97).

Political behavior, then, can not be explained in terms of personality alone. Such an attempt is a psychological reductionism which ignores the "chains of causation--that run--or fail to run--from underlying personality structure to social and political structure" (Greenstein, 1975, p. 123). Collectivities "are not merely the sum of the individuals they contain" (Greenstein, 1975, p. 120). Greenstein (1975) warns political scientists in schematic form:

> Personality structures $\neq$ political beliefs $\neq$ individual political action $\neq$ aggregate political structures and processes. (pp. 123-124; $\neq$ means "does not necessarily predict")

The dangers of ignoring the complexities of political behavior may be illustrated by psychological studies of decision making during crisis situations.

A crisis is a situation in which a decision making group is surprised by a perceived threat to the group's goals and has a very limited time to respond. Such a situation creates personal stress for decision makers and group (or social) stress. Researchers have attempted to discover whether moderate stress improves or interferes with decision making. However, the studies are far from conclusive. Kahn found that people operate better under stress, and they behave more efficiently. Lanzetta found that group conflicts decrease, and there is evidence of greater cooperation. Unlike Kahn and Lanzetta, Holsti found stress detrimental to the decision making group. There was increases of rigidity and intolerance. Behavior was simpler and more primitive in mode. Pruitt saw a law of diminishing returns. Some stress improves activity, but too much stress proves detrimental (discussion of Kahn, Lanzetta, Holsti, and Pruitt taken from notes on Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981). Thus although decision makers found themselves in similar "types" of situations, the complexities of the social relationships were not the same and therefore could not be viewed as constants. Thus psychological factors were not the only operating factors in the decision making situations that were different. Alone, psychological factors can not explain group behavior.

The four previously mentioned stress studies illustrate the use of psychological factors in decision making studies. These studies are prescriptive in nature. How should political actors go about improving the decision making process? Such studies assume an output variable in the form of good or bad policy. The studies assume a causal relationship between the decision making process and the output variable. In other words, the decision making process determines the nature of policy, good or bad. It is assumed that "a rational decision

making process' creates "good or rational policy." Any evaluation of a decision making process is based on comparison with a rational model of decision making. However, questions must be raised concerning "rational policy" and a "rational process."

"An action is rational to the extent that it is correctly designed to maximize goal achievement, given the goal in question, and the real world as it exists" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953, p. 38). Allison in Essence of Decision (1971) described a rational model of foreign policy decision making. This model assumes perfect information. Actions are goal directed in the pursuit of some strategic position. Alternatives are easily defined and well laid out. The process of choice involves a cost-effectiveness calculation. Such is the rational model of foreign policy decision making, but the question must be asked, "Is it possible for foreign policy decision making groups to meet these criteria?"

There is usually a condition of "uncertainity" in any foreign policy decision making process. "Uncertainity refers to the lack of adequate information about the situation at hand and/or the inadequacy of available general knowledge needed for assessing the expected outcomes of different courses of action" (George, 1980, p. 28). Usually there is no one overriding goal. The situation is one of "value-complexity". "Value-complexity refers to the presence of multiple, competing values and interests that are imbedded in a single issue" (George, 1980, p. 26). The rational model suggests a single governmental actor, a monolith. However, there are three interrelated subsystems of the policymaking system: the individual context, the small group context, and the organizational context (see George, 1980, p. 11). The rational model also suggests a type of cost-benefit analysis that identifies the goals of the decision making groups, examines the types of policies in terms of goals, plans for strategies and tactics to reach these goals, and measures the costs of implementation of these strategies and tactics in terms of perceived benefits (see Schultze, 1968). However, such an

analysis may not be suitable for foreign affairs analysis. How can one measure program costs against benefits? How can one plan for the long run in a shifting international environment? Which action best meets the groups goals? Schelling in "PPB and the complexities of Foreign Affairs," suggests that such a cost-benefit analysis is not realistic in foreign policy making (1971). Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) found that there are very few synoptic decision making processes, and those that are, are confined to the technical, lower levels of government. Snyder and Diesing have suggested that if a decision making process involves more than three people, the rational decision making model should not be used (from notes on Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff,1981)

Besides the question of a rational process, there is also the question of whether "rational policy," or "good policy" is a truly meaningful term. What is the difference between good policy and bad policy? Are we looking at a decision or the implementation of a decision? Was the decision a victim of an ever changing environment, or was the decision bad? Is the "good policy" one which is possible or one which is not realistic but seeks the "symbolic best?" "Rational policy" or "good policy" or "high quality-decisions" are "usually identified with the concept of 'national interest'--i.e., a high-quality decision is one in which the president correctly weighs the national interest in a particular situation and chooses a policy or an option that is more likely to achieve national interest at acceptable cost and risk" (George, 1980, p. 3). The assumption then is made that the "national interest" should guide decision makers.

However, the term "national interest" has become so "elastic and ambiguous a concept that its role as a guide to foreign policy is problematical and controversial" (George, 1980, p. 217). The term "national interest" is used in two different ways: "first, as a criterion to assess what is at stake in any given situation and to evaluate what course of action is 'best'; second, as a justification for decisions taken" (George, 1980, p. 218). The term is a "shopworn part of the

political rhetoric of every administration and at times a psychological crutch for leaders who become locked into disastrous policies" (George, 1980, p. 218).

"National interest" is a "nonoperational goal" (see George, 1980, p. 219). How can this term be meaningfully translated? "It does not provide a measuring rod for comparing alternative policies" (George, 1980, p. 219). The national interest is actually a complexity of competing subgoals. It is an example of value-complexity. George (1980) maintains that there are three "irreducible national interests": physical survival, liberty, and economic subsistence. However, together these do not define what is in the national interest. Similarly Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1980), suggest that there are two national interests: a fixed and a variable national interest. The fixed interests include: the preservation of the nation as a political community independent of others, the maintenance of liberty, territorial strength, and population, and the preservation of its political institutions. The variable interests include those fluctuating elements of political existence: national myths, political parties, international conditions, technological changes, and the changing political personalities. Halperin (1974) suggests that how a person defines "national interest" or how an organization defines "national interest" may be analyzed by examining: personal experiences, intellectual baggage, psychological needs, and position in the bureaucracy. Clearly although there are certain fundamental elements such as physical survival that may be described as being in the national interest, much of what is subsumed under that label is a subjective description. National interest is an "end". There are no rational "ends," for such an analysis is best placed in normative political philosophy and not in an empirical study of politics (see Isaak, 1975, p. 188; and Bluhm, 1965, p. 5).

The foreign policy making system is not a simple business designed on rationality. Destler (1974) writes:

> It is now widely recognized that organizations operate through webs of relationships far more complex than formal charts depict; that executive branch officials are not just 'neutral' implementers of 'policies' handed down by their superiors but play ongoing, day-to-day roles in shaping these policies; and that the typical way the government settles on particular courses of action is not through a group of high officials applying a rational design to specific problems, but by a 'pluralistic' process of political competition and compromise involving 'players' both inside and outside the government" (p. 41).

Two other foreign policy decision making models were suggested by Allison, the organizational process model and the bureaucratic political model. Briefly, the organizational process model pictured a government composed of semi-feudal groups that exercised considerable power. Leaders are limited by the norms and operating procedures of these groups. Decisions are outputs of a large organization functioning according to a variety of complex operating procedures (see Allison, 1971). The bureaucratic political model views government as a political arena. Decisions are the result of bargaining along regularized channels among players of various status in the organization. Decisions are the result of compromise (see Allison, 1971).

Destler (1974) and George (1980) were not satisfied with either the organizational process model or the bureaucratic politics model as an explanatory model. They both attempted to combine the models for a more fruitful explanatory device. Destler in his chapter, "Organization and Bureaucratic Politics," and George in his chapter, "Organizational Behavior and Bureaucratic Politics," attempt to address the "multilateral and multidimensional" problems of foreign policy decision making. Organizational and bureaucratic politics has four types of effects on the foreign policy decision making system:

1. effects on information-processing tasks;
2. effects on the content and quality of the decisions taken;
3. effects on diplomatic negotiations and communications; and
4. effects on implementation of presidential policy. (George, 1980, p. 111).

Destler's Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy (1974) is a prescriptive analysis. He seeks to discover how the government should be organized for "purposive and coherent" foreign policy (1974, p.p. 4-5). He assumes that organization determines output. If the process is goal-directed, purposive, reflective, and coordinated, then the optimal goal will be achieved (pp. 4-5). Good organization, for Destler, is a means to a desired end, a foreign policy goal.

Reform of the foreign policy decision making process must go beyond structural changes, according to Destler (1974, p. 83). Moreover, reforms should not try to "transcend" the bureaucratic politics inherent in organizations (Destler, 1974, p. 83). "Rather, it must be based on a strategy which copes with the patterns of politics and tries to turn these patterns to its advantage. This must be mainly an intra-governmental political strategy, one explicitly shaped to affect the bureaucratic politics of foreign policy decision-making" (Destler, 1974, p. 83). With this in mind, Destler gives three prescriptive suggestions for the decision process. First, as previously mentioned, the political patterns of bureaucratic interaction should be identified, and reforms then should be created so as to take advantage of these regularities. Secondly, the foreign policy process should be organized around the president, for only he "has sufficient legal authority, prestige, and other bargaining advantages--plus sufficent motivation--for carrying out coherent and purposive policy" (Destler, 1974, p. 84). Thirdly, the president must have around him a "group of related individuals who support and supplement the President in carrying out his foreign policy responsibilities, and who depend on his confidence for much of their own influence" (Destler, 1974, p. 90). Two elements must be considered here, competence and alliance.

"Competence" refers to the president's belief that "a subordinate is doing a strong, capable, effective job" (Destler, 1974, p. 90). "Alliance" refers to the president's "belief that a man is his man, responsive to him and loyal to him" (Destler, 1974, p. 90).

However, the president must keep watch over his chosen few, for none of these may rise to be of the same "star quality" as the president. If such a thing happened, it would threaten the symbolic advantages of the presidency. The men involved in the foreign policy process must be kept dependent on the president's evaluation of their work for their power. If not, the power of the foreign policy men would be independent of the presidential prerogative, and this would greatly deteriorate the power of the president over them. Thus the president would be competing for power with his own men.

Similarly, George (1980) in Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice stresses the interpersonal relationships between the president and his advisers. The key to George's prescriptive analysis is his emphasis on information processing. Policy may be improved by a "better" system of information processing. Thus, he warns us of the impediments to information processing which are contained in the social matrix. The impediments are anchored in:

> 1) the dynamics of individual behavior 2) the ways in which small policy-making groups are structured, their internal processes managed, and their communications with outsiders regulated; and 3) the patterns of behavior that emerge in complex organizations. (1980, p. 17)

George suggests that a system of "multiple advocacy" is the best solution for problems of information processing. "Multiple advocacy" occurs in "a policymaking system in which competition and disagreement among different participants is structured and managed in order to achieve the benefits of diverse points of view" (George, 1980, p. 193). George maintains that a multiple advocacy system

would "improve the quality of information search and appraisal and, thereby, illuminate better the problem the executive must decide and his options for doing so" (George, 1980, p. 193). The multiple advocacy system would require an active presidential involvement in the foreign policy process. It requires both "executive initiative and centralized coordination of some of the activities of participants in policymaking" (George, 1980, p. 193).

George lists three conditions that must be met for a system of multiple advocacy. They are worth repeating here:

1. No major maldistribution among the various actors in the policymaking system of the following intellectual and bureaucratic resources:

   a. Intellectual resources
      1) Competence relevant to the policy issues;
      2) Information relevant to the policy issues;
      3) Analytical support (e.g., staff, technical skills);

   b. Bureaucratic resources
      1) Status, power, standing with the president;
      2) Persuasion and bargaining skills.

2. Presidential-level participation in order to monitor and regulate the working of multiple advocacy.

3. Time for adequate debate and give-and-take.
   (George, 1980, p. 194)

Obviously, the president can not handle all of these tasks personally. Thus a trusted adviser must be there to give the president a hand in maintaining the multiple advocacy system (see George, 1980, pp. 195-200). However, similar problems arise in George's search for "the adviser" as occurred in Destler's search for "the adviser."

Both Destler and George's analysis create some difficulties for the student of politics. The organizational-bureaucratic politcal model which they present appears to contradict the very notion of purposive process. Destler admits this, yet

(1974, p. 73), he seems to suggest that by allowing for political patterns and taking advantage of them, the process will inevitably become more purposive and coherent (1974, p. 73-75). Similarly, George suggests that the greater the information the better the policy. This is an uncomfortable rule of thumb. What of system overload? What must be said for blissful ignorance under conditions of maximum stress. How much information is enough? How much is too little?

Destler (1974) and George (1980) do not give us practical rules for the structuring of foreign policy process. They give us vague strategies not tactics. Their prescriptions lack specificity and true operational translation.

It appears that there is an underlying political bias to both Destler (1974) and George's (1980) discussion of the presidency. Although Destler warns of excesses of certain characteristics of modern presidential behavior, he at the same time seems to applaud them. The president must be active in the foreign policy process. He must be a good partisan warrior and must stake his presidency in the foreign policy arena (see Destler, 1974, pp. 87-94). The president must have strong interpersonal skills and a keen sense of political negotiating to be successful in foreign policy (Destler, 1974, pp. 87-94). Destler's fundamental solution to the problem of foreign policy making is to teach the players to "play the game effectively" (see Destler, 1974, p. 81). This solution ultimately rests on the players' personalities and more specifically their interpersonal skills. In the end, George's multiple advocacy system must come to rest at the same point. But, he is much more upfront than Destler. In his three conditions for the multiple advocacy system, he paints a utopia of bureaucratic delights. Political actors have a competence in the problem area, for they have information related to the problem, and they possess the appropriate technical skills to grapple successfully. And a staff is available to aid them in their pursuit of the problem. The political actors possess status and power, and they are trusted

and respected by the president. In addition, they have great interpersonal, persuasion, and bargaining skills. The president is available as a steering mechanism for the entire process. And all problems are considered in a framework that allows for discussion, negotiation, and debate. In the end, much of this utopia is based on interpersonal factors. The picture of the American presidency presented in both Destler and George's work is a Neustadt-Barber hybrid with many of the same political underpinnings.

Other political writers have concentrated even more specifically on the president's relationships with his advisers. This approach is a combination of "impact analysis" and "presidential style analysis." An impact analysis (Lasswell, 1948, pp. 101-4) looks at the leader and the men around him and tries to discern in what ways the men serve the leader's needs. George (1980) suggests that the president goes to his advisers for information and advice, cognitive and emotional support, and understanding. Additionally, it gives the president's decision a touch of political legitimacy (Chapter 4). A presidential style analysis concentrates on how a president goes about managing his men. Usually the emphasis in contemporary literature is on the presidential style analysis.

Because it has long been recognized that the nature of the social matrix composed of the president and his men affects the development and implementation of policy, impact and presidential style analysis have been used to construct management models of presidential administrations. Neustadt (1963) identified a competitive model and a collegial model of management. Johnson (1974) identified three management approaches the formalistic, the competitive, and the collegial. Hess (1976) identified three models: competitive, hierarchical, and centralized. Nash, Eisenhower, Hoxie, and Spragens (1980) stressed the changing needs of presidential management over time.

Johnson (1974) is perhaps the most useful of these works, for he stresses that the formalistic, the competitive, and the collegial approaches are very simplistic in definition, and in reality each presidential administration is a combination of all three. Johnson (1974) weighs each approach in terms of benefits and costs. For example in the formalistic approach, the president's time is conserved, but the apparatus responds slowly or ineffectively in times of crisis. The competitive approach puts the president in the middle of things, but it requires a man of great interpersonal skills and a generous amount of time on his hands. The collegial approach places the president in the thick of things, but it requires great interpersonal skills and an unusual degree of comradeship among aides. Johnson (1974) stresses that whatever approach a president decides to emphasize and no matter how he decides to modify it with bits and pieces of the other two approaches, the management approach he decides upon is a personal creation. Management styles are shaped by a president's cognitive style, his sense of efficacy, and his orientation towards politics (see George, 1980, Chapter 7). The limitations of any one approach are overcome by presidential style and personality (Johnson, 1974).

The idea that management problems are overcome by presidential style is an enticing one. It has a ring of truth to it, for "the man affects the office." But such a notion must be handled with care, for it leads to psychological reductionism. For example here are two illustrations from Fenno's "The President's Cabinet:"

> Short variations in actual Cabinet behavior are in fact, traceable more to the influence of the President than to any other single factor--and traceable ultimately to the difference in temperament, ability, desire, experience, and habit which distinguish one presidential personality from another. (p. 318)

> Probably the most important of all factors relating to advice is that complex of presidential attitudes and habits which goes to make up his distinctive pattern of decision-making. (p. 323)

Destler's review of the management model literature is most illustrative of psychological reductionism (1974). Kennedy is pictured as a man with "a desire to reach out and grab for issues" (Destler, 1974, p. 99). He was a man of great interpersonal skills who has able to curb the excesses of the collegial style. Destler's comparison of Bundy (Kennedy) and Rostow (Johnson) is another form of psychological reductionism:

> Bundy was a pragmatist who seldom allowed his personal views on policy to prejudice his presentations of alternative viewpoints and balanced analyses to the President. He was also an exceptional administrator-operator. Rostow, by contrast, was primarily a thinker and more than a bit of an ideologue, who tended to view particular events in terms of the broader theoretical constructs he was most adept at developing. (1974, p. 107)

Under Destler's scrutiny President Johnson's personality does not fair very well. He is described as a man who sought informality but did not encourage criticism of policies. He is a man who allowed the presidency to be cut off from the rest of the world; and,the result was a "charmed circle" of "desperate men." According to Destler, this problem was the result of "a personal operating style which sought to maintain flexibility for the President by keeping others in the dark about his intentions" (1974, p. 110). Such phrases as "the President's innate tendency to sniff treason within government walls" suggests the picture (p. 111) of a paranoid president. Such a phrase is diagnostic rather than descriptive. Destler (1974) compares Nixon's decision making style to that of a judge "who weighs evidence and alternative courses of action in lonely splendor" (pp. 125-6). Kissinger's position in the foreign policy system was guaranteed for it complimemted Nixon's decision making style, and Kissinger's own operating style guaranteed the president's confidence in him (pp. 125-130).

In summary, presidential management styles are composites of various approaches. The style chosen by a particular president is the result of his cognitive style, his feelings of efficacy, and his orientation towards politics. However, how well

the style works is not determined by presidential personality alone, rather the success or failure of a given management approach is the result of the reciprocal, transactional relationships between the political actors involved.

In summary, Halperin (1974) has identified four factors that influence the outcome of a decision making situation: one, the standing of the political actors involved (depends upon their past experiences, their career patterns, and their position in the bureaucracy); two, the formal and informal rules that "guide the issue through the system;" three, "the information (processing) and analysis used by the participants to select from alternative positions and to argue their cases;" and four, "the disposition of the president" (based on his perception of the political environment) (p. 99). Besides the alterations already made in Halperin's factors, this author would add one more, and that would be that all four factors be viewed in a kinetic, interlocking, multi-dimensional, multi-lateral, transactional, interpersonal process, i.e., the social matrix.

Besides the theoretical problems already discussed, there exists certain methodological and data problems for the student of personality and the student of the foreign policy process.

Most obvious is the problem of observation. Observation in itself is a social process. Eulau writes:

> Behavior is a series of acts through which man moves in time and space. It is a datum of observation but a datum that does not constitute a self-evident fact. Instead it is a fact that is given meaning by the observer in the very process of observation. (1963, p. 112)

"Observation is as much giving meaning to the behavior that is observed as being engaged in meaningful behavior" (Eulau, 1963, p. 112). Observation is a reciprocal communicative act and must be treated as such. If observation is regarded otherwise, a blunder has been committed. A researcher must be sensitive

to his own participation in the scene before him. He must be aware of the dangers of intellectual stereotyping, selective perception, filtering screens, to the observational act. It is not that they can be avoided, but at least, the researcher, if he is aware, is honest to himself (and hopefully to his readers) (for a discussion see Lovell).

In addition to the problems related to the nature of observation, there are also problems relating to the situation in which the observational act takes place. Does the researcher have access to an appropriate sample of his universe? Is the observational act conducted directly or indirectly? Does the researcher have access to "behind the scenes" information relating to the foreign policy decision making process? Is there a problem of inaccessible technical data? Does the researcher have the expertise to understand the technical data, if he can obtain it? Are there information vacuums that the researcher must in some way "leap across"?

Greenstein has suggested that in behavioral studies there are certain "attribution problems." Although his original use of the concept was confined to his criticism of personality studies, it may be used equally well in a critique of foreign policy decision making studies. According to Greenstein (1975), there are three approaches to characterizing behavior: phenomenology, dynamics, and genesis. Phenomenology is the observed "regular patterns of behavior that the individual or type exhibits under varying environmental conditions" (Greenstein, 1975, p. 65). Phenomenology is an unexplained description of a subject's behavior. It may be viewed as merely counting a subject's acts. Dynamics is a step beyond phenomenology. It goes from merely counting a subject's acts to dynamically interpreting them. A researcher would look at the patterns of behavior and ask, "Why?". Dynamics go beyond the description of acts into the world of diagnosis.

Genesis is an approach that goes even farther into the diagnostic mode. A researcher looks at contemporary acts and attempts to explain them in terms of "inborn structure, maturation, and experience" (Greenstein, 1975, p.66). It must be remembered that any meaning attached to a behavioral unit is a construct of the observer. The more one goes beyond simply describing acts the more dangerous ground one is treading. While the phenomenology, dynamics, and genesis approaches to the study of behavior are all risky, the level of risk is greater when one begins to diagnose the behavior. The explanation of any behavior is always risky, for the explanation is merely a construct of the observer (see Greenstein, 1975, p. 67; p. 105).

In addition to the problems of attribution, there is a similar problem of a priori characterization of the sample (see Greenstein, 1975, p. 128). Most often there are a priori characterizations made on the basis of political values (George, 1975, p. 93). Hargrove (1966) in his work Personality and Political Style, and Barber (1972) in The Presidential Character stressed the need for a strong, active, president who would serve as an agency of popular reform. The president needed to be sensitive to power and the game of politics in order to wield influence. Their criticism of Presidents was based upon their a priori decision of what was "good" for the presidency and the country. Hargrove and Barber's classification scheme became diagnostic in nature.

Another problem in these studies is a tendency towards psychological reductionism. This manifests itself in several ways. First of all, attempts are made to suggest that the psychological factors are the determinants of all social and political behavior. Secondly, a complex social matrix is given a stereotypical label, and the richness of the complexity is then lost for the

rest of the analysis. And finally, there is a tendency to ignore the possibility of a negative influence of personality or a null influence of personality on behavior (see Greenstein, 1975, pp. 123-132).

The micro-macro dilemma also poses a problem. May the observed behavior on a micro-level (the individual for example) be used to infer about the behavior of the macro-level (entire group)? Such an attempt serves to ignore the "continuous sets of interlocking behavioral chains" that make up social behavior (see Eulau, 1963, p.p. 124-5). If a researcher moves from an observation of the macro-level to the micro-level, a problem of personification occurs (Eulau, 1963, pp. 126-7). "Aggregate data conceals variances in behavior" (Eulau, 1963, p. 126). How much meaning does the term "a group's loyalty" have? Are we speaking of a group property independent of the individuals in the group? Or are we speaking of the sum of the characteristics of the members of the group (see Eulau, 1963, p. 127)?

And finally, there is the problem of attempting to explain a dynamic process. Behavioral acts occur through time and space. Yet when we attempt to explain social behavior, we place frames around certain acts with certain temporal and spatial settings, but the question must be asked, "Does such a practice violate the very nature of the social matrix?" The answer is, "Yes, but how else can we conduct research" (see Eulau, 1963, pp. 127-8)?

Greenstein has identified three means of behavioral analysis: single-case, typological, and aggregation (1975, p. 14). Case studies examine an individual unit in a comprehensive manner (Sorauf, 1965, p.p. 35-36). They are known for their narrative descriptive style (Isaak, 1975). Sorauf (1965) writes that case studies have "the color and intrinsic interest of fine political journalism" (p. 35). The disadvantages of the case study are several. First

of all, the grounds for selecting the case are often not clear. Secondly, by studying a single case, there are problems of generalizability and reliability. And thirdly, because of their descriptive nature, there are real analytical limits to the research (Sorauf, 1965, pp. 35-37). Because of the already complex nature of the subject, personality studies and decision making studies are often case studies, for attempts are made to simplify the investigative process through the use of the case study. Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House is an example of single-case study.

Typological studies involve a multi-case analysis. This improves to some small degree the problems of generalizability and reliability, but the problems of the case study still linger even though attempts are made to construct more sophisticated analytical devices. Barber's The Presidential Character is an example of a typological study.

Aggregation analysis looks at the "collective effects of individuals and types on the functioning of political institutions" (Greenstein, 1975, p. 14) Individual characteristics are used to infer characteristics of a social group (a micro-macro dilemma). The Civic Culture is an example of an aggregation analysis.

Various tools of the research trade are used in personality and decision making studies to collect data. Two such tools will be considered here, surveys and intensive interviewing.

In the use of surveys, the question must be asked, is the researcher actually measuring what he or she intended to measure? Most often the answer is no. Surveys and interviews are both social tools. They both have an intra-and-inter-

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personal nature. Thus the researcher does not know what he is getting, a social response targeted for the researcher, or a behavior linked in the person's mind with an attitude or predispositon that he has. If one is observing the dynamics of a group, often survey responses must be weighted (non-addivity) because of differences in roles, status, and activity. But how does one go about doing it? How can a researcher realistically assign a number representing a person's input into and influence of a group? The suggestion that a researcher can, poses an intellectual problem. If a person's role, his inputs into the group and his "influence" in the group is known, and if the group is a social process, then the group is already "explained and known" thus the research is unnecessary to start with in this particular area.

Intensive analysis yields richer data than does a survey where responses are often limited. However, subjectivity in the evaluation of this intra-inter-personal act is perhaps greater than in the survey evaluation. The question again must be asked, "is the researcher measuring what he thinks he is measuring?" And again the answer is "probably not."

In concluding, a brief bit of poetic license seems justified. There exists in personality studies and foreign policy decision making studies, problems of evidence, inference, and conceptualization (Greenstein, 1975, p. 1).

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